Pineda v. Campos

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In Re the Marriage of:

YADY DIAZ PINEDA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

ROBERT J. CAMPOS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0912 FC
FILED 08-07-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2024-051857
The Honorable Hope E. Fruchtman, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of Kamille Dean, P.C.
By Kamille R. Dean
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Yady Diaz Pineda
Petitioner/Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Vice-Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey
joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Robert Campos (“Husband”) appeals the superior court’s
order continuing an order of protection issued in favor of Yady Diaz Pineda
(“Wife”) and imposing firearm restrictions. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Late one night in October 2024, Wife returned home from
dinner with her coworkers only to be confronted by Husband. The next day,
Wife filed a police report alleging Husband assaulted her, adding that
similar abuse had occurred throughout their six-year marriage. Two days
later, Wife petitioned for an order of protection.

¶3 Wife alleged that, on the night of the confrontation, she
walked into her home to find Husband. He was recording her with his
phone and calling her names. Husband followed Wife through the house,
accusing her of infidelity and reaching under her dress. Husband then
grabbed her by the arms to turn her around to face him. Wife also alleged
an earlier incident. During an argument in January 2024, Husband grabbed
her by the arms, shook her, and cursed at her. Finally, Wife alleged that
Husband owned or carried a firearm or other weapons and requested
restrictions on his ability to do so.

¶4 The superior court issued an ex parte order of protection that
found Husband posed a credible threat to Wife and imposed firearm
restrictions pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Section 13-3602(G)(4).
Husband timely requested a hearing to contest the order of protection.

¶5 At the hearing, Wife testified consistent with the allegations
in her petition and introduced a video recording of the confrontation.
Husband disputed Wife’s description of the confrontation. He explained
that before the confrontation, he had already retained counsel to file for
divorce. He admitted that he was angry because he had been waiting all

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day for her to come home so he could confront her, but his sole intention
was to talk to her and try to salvage their marriage. Husband testified he
did nothing to stop Wife from leaving that night and denied that any
physical contact occurred.

¶6 The superior court found Wife was more credible than
Husband and that Husband’s aggressive behavior in the video exhibit led
it to believe the confrontation involved some physical contact. The court
upheld the order of protection on that basis. Husband asked the court to
remove the firearm restriction; the court denied his request on the ground
that federal firearm restrictions are “mandatory” when the affected party
requests a hearing on an order of protection.

¶7 The superior court entered an amended order of protection
prohibiting Husband from engaging in “conduct involving the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force that would reasonably
be expected to cause bodily injury,” and expressly finding that Husband
“pose[d] a credible threat to [Wife’s] physical safety.” The order restricted
Husband’s right to possess firearms under Arizona law, see A.R.S. § 13-
3602(G)(4), and warned that it may be unlawful under federal law for
Husband to possess firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). In a separate hearing
order, the superior court found that federal firearm restrictions applied, and
it issued a Notice of Brady Indicator.

¶8 Husband timely appealed and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§
12-2101(A)(1), (A)(5)(b).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Husband argues the superior court erred in continuing the
order of protection because it did not specify a statutory ground for its
finding that Husband committed an act of domestic violence sufficient to
trigger an order of protection. He also asserts firearm restrictions were
inappropriate because the court did not make an individualized credible
threat finding or ask whether Husband owned or possessed firearms.

I. Order of Protection

¶10 We review an order of protection for an abuse of discretion.
Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 10 (App. 2014). To issue an order of
protection, a superior court must find “reasonable cause to believe . . . the
defendant may commit an act of domestic violence,” or that “the defendant
has committed an act of domestic violence within the past year.” A.R.S. §
13-3602(E)(1)–(2). Domestic violence includes a broad range of statutory

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offenses like stalking, harassment, assault, and threatening or intimidating.
A.R.S. § 13-3601(A). The plaintiff has the burden of proving a statutory
ground for domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence. Ariz. R.
Prot. Order P. 38(g)(3). “At the conclusion of the hearing, the judicial officer
must state the basis for continuing, modifying, or revoking the protective
order.” Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 38(g)(4).

¶11 Husband argues Rule 38(g)(4) requires the court to “pin[]
down which statutory offense was committed and trac[e] how the facts
aligned with that offense.” As detailed below, infra ¶¶ 23–26, Husband’s
briefing cites or quotes from several authorities to support this contention.
We have reviewed those authorities. The quotations Husband attributes to
the cited cases appear nowhere in the cases. None of the cases stand for
Husband’s proposition. In fact, several of them contradict it. And two of his
citations contain incorrect reporters that refer to entirely unrelated cases.

¶12 The plain text of Rule 38(g)(4) does not require a superior
court to specify the statutory offense underpinning a domestic violence
finding. The court need only find that an act of domestic violence has
occurred or is likely to occur. See, e.g., Glick v. Glick, 1 CA-CV 22-0434 FC,
2023 WL 2809203, at *3, ¶ 21 (Ariz. App. Apr. 6, 2023) (mem. decision)
(“Here, as Rule 38 requires, the [superior] court stated that . . . an act or acts
of domestic violence was the basis for continuing the Order. And that is all
that the [superior] court was required to state.”). “[W]e may infer additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to sustain the [superior]
court’s order as long as those findings are reasonably supported by the
evidence, and not in conflict with any express findings.” Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, 489, ¶ 11 (App. 1998).

¶13 Here, the superior court made specific findings that (1) the
video of the confrontation “makes me believe that there was some physical
contact,” and (2) Wife’s testimony about the confrontation was more
credible than Husband’s. The court explicitly connected those findings to
its decision to continue the order of protection.

¶14 Based on those findings and the reasonable evidence in the
record, we can infer that the superior court found Husband assaulted Wife.
A person commits assault by “[i]ntentionally placing another person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury” or “[k]nowingly
touching another person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke such
person.” A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2)–(3). We defer to the superior court’s
determination that Wife’s testimony about the confrontation was more
credible than Husband’s. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 619, ¶ 17 (App.

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2012). In addition to the parties’ testimony, the superior court considered
Mother’s video exhibit which showed Husband being verbally and
physically aggressive. We discern no error in the superior court
determining Wife met her burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence that Husband intentionally placed her in reasonable apprehension
of imminent physical injury. We therefore affirm the superior court’s
finding of domestic violence and its decision to continue the order of
protection.

II. Firearm Restrictions

¶15 Husband challenges the Arizona and federal firearm
restrictions, arguing they are inappropriate because (1) the court did not
make an individualized credible threat finding, and (2) there was no
evidence Husband owned, used, or had access to firearms. “We review the
application of Arizona and federal law to the facts de novo.” Savord, 235
Ariz. at 260, ¶ 20 (quoting Mahar v. Acuna, 230 Ariz. 530, 534, ¶ 14 (App.
2012)) (cleaned up). We affirm a judgment of the superior court if it is
correct for any reason. FL Receivables Tr. 2002-A v. Ariz. Mills, L.L.C., 230
Ariz. 160, 166, ¶ 24 (App. 2012).

¶16 Under Arizona law, if a court issuing an order of protection
“finds that the defendant is a credible threat to the physical safety of the
plaintiff,” the court may “prohibit the defendant from possessing or
purchasing a firearm for the duration of the order.” A.R.S. § 13-3602(G)(4).
Federal law similarly prohibits a person subject to a protective order from
purchasing or possessing a firearm when the protective order either (1)
“includes a finding that [the] person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of [an] intimate partner or child,” or (2) “by its terms
explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)–(ii). Rule 23(i)
thus requires the judicial officer issuing an order of protection to “ask the
plaintiff about the defendant’s use of or access to firearms to determine
whether the defendant poses a credible threat to the physical safety of the
plaintiff.” Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 23(i)(1).

¶17 In challenging the firearm restrictions, Husband misstates
three key facts in the record. First, he asserts the superior court failed to
make an individualized credible threat finding to justify imposing firearm
restrictions. Not so. The superior court expressly found in its amended
order of protection that “Defendant poses a credible threat to the physical
safety of Plaintiff.” Second, Husband asserts there was no evidence that

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Husband owned, used, or had access to firearms, and that Wife never
alleged that Husband owned a gun. This is also untrue. Wife’s petition
alleged that Husband “owns or carries a firearm or other weapons.” Third,
Husband asserts the court “fail[ed] to ascertain any actual . . . request for a
firearm restriction.” Wrong. Wife’s petition requested that “Defendant
should be ordered NOT to possess firearms while this order is in effect.”
(emphasis in original).

¶18 Husband correctly asserts the superior court failed to conduct
a Rule 23(i) inquiry into Husband’s use or possession of firearms. This was
error, but not a reversible one. Rule 23(i) requires a superior court to “ask
the plaintiff about the defendant’s use of or access to firearms to determine
whether the defendant poses a credible threat to the physical safety of the
plaintiff or other protected persons.” Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 23(i)(1). But a
Rule 23(i) inquiry is not the sole basis for a court to make a credible threat
finding. See In re Matter of Kahle v. Kahle, 1 CA-CV 23-0738 FC, 2024 WL
3618436, at *3, ¶ 14 (Ariz. App. Aug. 1, 2024) (mem. decision) (parties’
testimony about husband’s firearms mooted court’s failure to conduct a
Rule 23(i) inquiry). Wife’s allegation that Husband owns or carries firearms,
and the evidence of Husband’s threatening behavior, support the court’s
credible threat finding and the Arizona firearms restriction under Section
13-3602(G)(4). The order of protection also met all requirements under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A)–(B), and thus the credible threat finding triggered
federal firearm restrictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i).

¶19 Finally, Husband argues the superior court erroneously
treated the federal firearm restriction as an automatic consequence of an
order of protection. In imposing the federal firearm restriction, the superior
court stated: “[T]he Brady Law is a federal requirement that if a hearing is
requested on an order o[f] protection and the order is upheld, the firearms
must be relinquished . . . so unfortunately, I have no choice, it’s mandatory.”
We take this statement to be a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), which
provides that an order of protection can trigger federal firearm restrictions
when it contains language prohibiting physical force against an intimate
partner. Contrary to the superior court’s statement, the federal statute does
not divest Arizona courts of choosing whether to impose firearm
restrictions on a defendant. The Arizona Rules of Protective Order
Procedure impose an affirmative requirement for courts to conduct a Rule
23(i) inquiry and make a credible threat finding before restricting a
defendant’s core constitutional right to bear arms. Ariz. R. Prot. Order P.
23(i). “[W]hile federal laws [generally] control the substantive aspects of
federal claims adjudicated in state courts, state rules of procedure . . . apply
unless the state rules would affect a substantive federal right.” Shotwell v.

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Donahoe, 207 Ariz. 287, 290, ¶ 6 (2004); cf. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300
(1982) (“[A] State may confer procedural protections of liberty interests that
extend beyond those minimally required by the Constitution of the United
States.”).

¶20 But the federal statute expresses a disjunctive requirement—
a court may impose a firearm restriction upon either a credible threat
finding, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), or the statutory prohibitory language,
id. at (ii). Because the superior court here found that Husband posed a
credible threat to Wife, the federal firearm restriction was appropriate
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i).

¶21 We affirm the Arizona and federal firearm restrictions.

III. Husband’s Counsel’s Brief

¶22 As discussed in ¶ 17 supra, Husband made several false
statements of the record regarding the firearm restrictions. And as noted in
¶ 11 supra, Husband’s briefing also contained many misleading or incorrect
citations. The erroneous citations in particular are so egregious that they
bear more attention.

¶23 Husband cites Arjona v. Arjona, 1 CA-CV 21-0261 FC, 2022 WL
1261283 (Ariz. App. Apr. 28, 2022) (mem. decision) and claims it
“emphasiz[es] that a trial court’s failure to specify which acts of alleged
domestic violence supported its decision undermines meaningful scrutiny
on appeal.” Arjona says nothing of the sort, and did not involve an order of
protection or domestic violence. Arjona was an appeal of an order denying
a mother’s motion to alter or amend a legal decision-making decree in a
child custody dispute. Beyond that, the cited memorandum decision has
been vacated. Arjona v. Arjona, CV-22-0119-PR, 2022 WL 16832578 (Ariz.
Sept. 2, 2022) (mem. decision).

¶24 Husband cites “Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 454 (App. 2012),”
claiming the court in that case “emphasized that ‘some’ substantive rational
is indispensable, lest the rationale remain hidden and unreviewable.” The
reporter information in that citation corresponds to the ninth page of Lund
v. Myers ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 230 Ariz. 445 (App. 2012) which is an
opinion of this Court addressing in camera review of attorney-client
privileged documents. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated that opinion in
Lund v. Myers, 232 Ariz. 309 (2013). We have also searched Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614 (App. 2012) in vain and it does not support Husband’s
proposition.

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¶25 Husband cites “Leon v. Plaza, 251 Ariz. 575 (App. 2021)” and
claims that case upheld an order of protection “precisely because the trial
court named a specific incident . . . and explained how that incident satisfied
the requirement of a domestic violence offense.” The reporter information
in that citation corresponds to the second page of Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574 (2021), which is an Arizona Supreme Court case about
terminating parental rights. Assuming Husband meant to cite to Leon v.
Plaza, 2 CA-CV 2021-0111, 2022 WL 703666 (Ariz. App. Mar. 9, 2022) (mem.
decision), he incorrectly characterized the case. The superior court there did
not explain how the incident constituted a domestic violence offense, nor
did it name a qualifying statutory offense. Id. at *3, ¶ 11.

¶26 Finally, Husband cites Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256 (App.
2014) for two quotations: (1) “specific findings assist the appellate court in
determining whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard,” and
(2) that the court emphasized the need for “reasonable evidence of a past
act or acts of domestic violence.” Neither quotation appears in Savord.

¶27 Regardless of what explanation exists for the errors in
Husband’s briefing, his counsel has ethical duties of candor to this Court
and to certify that representations made to this Court are accurate. Ariz. R.
Sup. Ct. 42, ER 3.3; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(a); see also Mangan v. Mangan, 227 Ariz.
346, 353–54, ¶¶ 29–32 (App. 2011) (sanctioning counsel for misrepresenting
the record and relying on inappropriate legal authorities). We forward this
decision to the State Bar of Arizona to determine whether counsel violated
any rules of professional conduct.

COSTS ON APPEAL

¶28 We have discretion to sanction parties and their attorneys for
violating the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, and to discourage
similar conduct in the future. ARCAP 25; see also Johnson v. Brimlow, 164
Ariz. 218, 221–22 (App. 1990). Husband’s counsel’s misrepresentations of
the record and misleading citations to legal authorities violate ARCAP
13(a)(7) (requiring citations to legal authorities and the record).

¶29 Accordingly, although neither party requests fees or costs on
appeal, we conclude that an award of costs to Wife is appropriate as a
sanction. See Braillard v. Maricopa Cnty., 224 Ariz. 481, 499, ¶ 60 (App. 2010)
(prevailing party can recover costs on appeal even without an adequate
ARCAP 21(a) request in the briefs). Husband’s counsel shall be solely
responsible for Wife’s costs on appeal upon Wife’s compliance with
ARCAP 21(b).

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CONCLUSION

¶30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of protection
and firearm restrictions.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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